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Abstract
Purpose: Recently, magic has been given increasing attention by psychologists for what it can reveal about how 
the human cognitive system works.  This paper examines whether these same cognitive processes are at play in 
another arena, speciﬁ  cally, the presentation of ﬁ  nancial accounting information.
Approach: The authors reviewed the ﬁ  ndings of cognitive scientists from their studies of magicians and applied 
these to the activities of professional accountants.
Findings: Speciﬁ  c cognitive processes which magicians and accountants take advantage of, explicitly for one and 
implicitly for the other, are the same: good continuation, habituation, and attentional capture.
Value: Further research regarding such interactions between accounting and cognition has potential for enhan-
cing our understanding of both. Certainly at this particular point in accounting history, as standard setters 
seem to be moving ever closer to implementing some version of a principles-based accounting regime versus our 
current rules-based accounting regime, it is worthwhile to contemplate the conscious and subconscious effects 
of cognitive processes on how individuals perceive ﬁ  nancial information.
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  | Introduction
The ﬁ  rst chapter of a book about the theory of entertainment magic leads off with a succinct deﬁ  -
nition: “The performance of magic employs a method (how the trick works) to produce an effect 
(what the spectator perceives)” (Lamont and Wiseman 1999, p. 1). Professional magicians delib-
erately trick spectators’ cognitive processes into perceiving an unreal effect produced through 
the use of a real method unknown to the spectators. The word “real” here means consistent with 
humans’ evolved common sense of how the physical world works. However, spectators know that 
they are being tricked, that their perceptions are mistaken and are not to be trusted, and that 
despite appearances, their understanding of reality has not been violated. They are entertained 
by the ability of the magician to create the apparently unreal effect and by the challenge of dis-
covering the magician’s real method for producing it.
Textbook accounting does not resemble magic; one might even say it is its antithesis. Ethical pro-
fessional accountants do not deliberately trick spectators’ perceptions; rather, they produce faith-
ful representations of economic reality through the use of well-known, transparent methods. 
The word “reality” here means the activities in which an enterprise engages to convert resource 
inputs into product outputs. Spectators can trust accountants, the accountants’ representations, 
and the underlying economic reality being represented. Unlike with magic, audiences are not 
entertained by a performance taking place before their eyes; rather, they are informed by the 
content of pre-prepared statements. If accountants can be said to perform, they do so elsewhere 
in private and not in front of spectators.
A familiar ontological discussion within the scholarly accounting community is that there is 
nothing that qualiﬁ  es as the economic reality; rather, a reality is created by every accounting 
representation. Individual activities, resource inputs, and product outputs are all created con-
currently with their representation. This is not to say that there is no economic reality, but it 
has no inherent accounting form. It has to be structured, and every representational structure 
requires choices regarding what pieces of reality are worth categorizing, what categories are 
created, and what is put in each category. This is an instance of the “Word Magic” effect (Ogden 
1936): “The Word Magic effect of a category term is that it leads unwary users to believe that the 
category thus named really exists. One way of looking at this is to say that the category or class 
– any category or class – really does exist as a mental reality if a name for that category exists in 
the language” (Bellos 2011, p. 27, italics added). For example, there really are assets, liabilities, 
equities, income and expenses, despite the sometimes considerable difﬁ  culty and bitter conﬂ  ict 
determining what is what.
Subsequent to accounting’s categorizations, choices must be made regarding what categories are 
to be included, and how they are to be included, in the ﬁ  nancial statement representation and 
what parts are to be excluded from it. In effect, this builds an additional level upon the “Word 
Magic” effect in which the linguistic/numeric representation of an enterprise is taken to be an   
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iconic image of the enterprise. In other words, entities (accounting representations of enterprises) 
are real because they are made up of other entities that are real (accounting categories) because 
they have been named. However, no representation can be wholly trusted as it is never wholly 
comprehensive and never wholly indisputable, and no spectator is unequivocally informed, let 
alone entertained. 
In effect, magic and accounting both employ a sort of trickery. In magic, magicians trick com-
plicit spectators about physical reality: what they had believed to be impossible appears to be 
possible. In accounting, accountants and their audiences are complicit in tricking themselves 
about economic reality: what they believe to be real is indeed real and what they believe not to be 
real is indeed not real.  One might say that everyone in the public arena conjures a reality (politi-
cians, executives, journalists, artists, etc.), but these realities are unhesitatingly recognized for 
what they are: opinions of their creators. In contrast, those realities conjured by accounting are 
physical artifacts having ofﬁ  cial certiﬁ  cation.
But does accounting employ the same sort of trickery of cognitive processes as does magic, or for that 
matter, is it even reasonable to call it trickery at all? Magic concerns what is possible or impossible for 
real objects to do; accounting concerns whether entities and reported transactions are real or not. Are 
spectators’ perceptions of what magicians are making objects do before their eyes cognitively tricked 
in the same way as audiences’ perceptions of whether the transactions with which accountants have 
populated the ﬁ  nancial statements are real and whether the transactions which accountants have 
excluded from the ﬁ  nancial statements are not? Does either sort of trickery exploit the same cognitive 
fallibilities of investors with which behavioral ﬁ  nance and economics have been concerned?
As is true of a magic show, there is more to these questions than meets the eye, and each of the fol-
lowing sections explores an important dimension of the magic of the practice of accounting. Section 
II asserts that magic is not simply an engaging metaphor for accounting; rather, accounting is magic, 
albeit magic that through familiarity fails to elicit the sense of wonder one expects from real magic. 
Section III argues that like magic, accounting is a performance: not in a theater or available to view by 
download from the Internet but a performance nonetheless. Following a short outline of the principal 
features of the theory of magic in section IV, section V describes how accounting exploits the same 
cognitive processes as does entertainment magic. Section VI concludes with a brief summary of the 
implications for the practice of accounting and future accounting research were one to explore more 
deeply the cognitive bases upon which both magic and accounting depend.
  | Magic and metaphor
What is magic?  In his article “Explaining the ‘Magic’ of Consciousness”, the philosopher Daniel 
Dennett (2003) uses magic as a metaphor in posing the question whether the phenomenon of 
consciousness is real magic or not:   
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Real magic, in other words, refers to the magic that is not real, while the magic that is real, that 
can actually be done, is not real magic… (It is) stage magic, a set of phenomena that exploit our 
gullibility, and even our desire to be fooled, bamboozled, awestruck… It cannot be real if it is 
explicable as a phenomenon achieved by a bag of ordinary tricks-cheap tricks, you might say 
(Dennett 2003, p. 7–8)4.
According to the Oxford English Dictionary (http://www.oed.com/), the primary deﬁ  nition of the 
word “magic” is “the use of ritual activities or observances which are intended to inﬂ  uence the 
course of events or to manipulate the natural world, usually involving the use of an occult or 
secret body of knowledge.” Thus, the practice of accounting is not literally magic, as it concerns 
the social world, not the natural world and it is not occult. Of course, accounting is often per-
ceived by novices and outsiders as much more objective (“natural”) than the social construction 
it actually is.  Certainly the practice of accounting can be ﬁ  guratively and satirically likened to 
magic. Critics (and more than a few students) have described it with such words and phrases as 
“manipulation,” “agencies of a secret or mysterious nature,” “beyond ordinary understanding or 
knowledge,” “abstruse, mysterious,” “inexplicable,” “without any apparent explanation,” etc., and 
all of these phrases are used in other Oxford English Dictionary deﬁ  nitions5. However, the real 
question is whether there might be parallels between magic and the practice of accounting lying 
between these poles of perfect identity and pejorative metaphor.
The point Dennett made in his article is that there is nothing truly magical or supernatural about 
consciousness; it can be explained by what is known, or at least knowable, about the physiology of the 
brain. But even though the “how” of consciousness might not be magical, the “why” of consciousness 
might well be. Physicist Eugene P. Wigner, in his Richard Courant Lecture in Mathematical Sciences 
entitled “The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences”, concluded: 
The miracle of the appropriateness of the language of mathematics for the formulation of the laws 
of physics is a wonderful gift which we neither understand nor deserve.  We should be grateful 
for it and hope that it will remain valid in future research and that it will extend, for better or for 
worse to our pleasure even though perhaps also to our bafﬂ  ement, to wide branches of learning 
(Wigner 1960, p. 14).
Although neither the word “magic” nor the word “occult” is used in the article, the frequent use of 
the word “miracle” conveys a similar sense that mathematics is “an inexplicable and remarkable 
inﬂ  uence producing surprising results” and has “an enchanting or mystical quality” about it, again 
employing dictionary phrases. There is indeed something magical about consciousness of the natural 
world and the ability to know it through mathematics. With regard to accounting, it has come to feel 
4  There would likely be less confusion in English, had the word “illusion” not been replaced by the word “magic” to refer to a staged perfor-
mance.  Polish, for example, retains a linguistic distinction between iluzja and magia.
5  In the ﬁ  lm The Smartest Guys in the Room, Enron CFO Andrew Fastow is referred to as a “sorcerer,” while the song playing in the back-
ground is That Old Black Magic. The authors are indebted to an anonymous reviewer for this interesting popular cultural reference.  
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perfectly natural that certain records of certain economic activities can be assembled into a faithful 
representation of an enterprise. Nowadays, that an enterprise consists of its assets and its liabilities 
and equities and that it transforms itself through income and expenses is certainly considerably less 
miraculous, or considerably less magical, than an equation equating energy and mass that expresses 
a fundamental structural principle of the universe. But prior to the widespread acceptance of double-
entry bookkeeping, the accounting would have been regarded as pretty amazing.
Neither psychologists nor mathematicians nor accountants resemble magicians performing stage 
magic. Howsoever it might appear to those outside these professions, they do nothing “as though 
accomplished by supernatural means or trickery” or “without any apparent explanation.” But 
there is nonetheless something magical about what they concern themselves with (conscious-
ness and mathematics and markets) and what they produce (mathematical models of the natural 
world and ﬁ  nancial models of the economic world). They share with their audiences the illusion 
that there is no real magic involved, while stage magicians create the illusion that there is. If 
magical illusions are produced in the course of performances, then what sorts of performances, 
if any, produce accounting illusions?
  | Magic and performance
At the heart of the profession of stage magician is performance in front of an audience, just as 
the word “stage” would suggest. This is not literally true of psychologists, mathematicians, or 
accountants. Although accountants are rarely, if ever, found dressed in evening clothes and 
bathed in spotlights on a stage in a theatre fronted by a marquee featuring their names, they, 
like all other professionals, have audiences for their work. These are the investors, regulators and 
other stakeholders having an interest in the economic performance of an enterprise. Magicians 
are well aware of the importance of their relationship with the audience: 
Magicians understand the careful interactions of secret and performance and have learned to 
appreciate the art for these subtleties… The success of a magician lies in making a human con-
nection to the magic, the precise focus that creates a fully realized illusion in the minds of the 
audience (Steinmeyer 2003, p. 17). 
Accountants, however, act as if there were an impenetrable wall between themselves and their 
audiences. Financial statements in the United States are certiﬁ  ed as having been prepared in 
accordance with generally accepted accounting principles, ostensibly objective standards that 
render them free of biases, partialities, prejudices, etc. These completed statements are passed 
over the wall to anonymous others, who are free to make of them what they will.
Yet the wall is a Chinese wall, a pretense or illusion, that the parties on either side have agreed 
to maintain.  Magicians are under no illusions that “… a magic show is a piece of theatre”, and   
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“Jean Robert Houdini was famous for the opinion that a magician is actually just an actor playing 
the part of a (real) magician” (Steinmeyer 2003, p. 17). Likewise, considering the ontological dis-
cussion in the preceding section, ﬁ  nancial statements are also pieces of theatre, purported faith-
ful representations of an economic reality for which no truly faithful representation is possible. 
Accountants are actors playing the part of accountants, pretending to possess skills at reiﬁ  cation 
that do not exist. Still, accountants and their audiences are under an illusion denying this.
With a skeptical audience, magicians face a difﬁ  cult task: 
A great magic performance consists of a collection of tiny lies, in words and deeds, that are 
stacked and arranged ingeniously to form the battlement for an illusion. It’s a delicate battle 
of wits – an audience that welcomes being deceived, then dares to be fooled, alternately ques-
tioning, prodding, and surrendering. A great magician seems always to play catch-up to their 
thoughts but secretly must stay two steps ahead – not only solicitous and anticipating, but sug-
gesting (Steinmeyer 2003, p. 17).
Accountants have it easier. Financial statements are also “… a collection of tiny lies, in words 
and deeds, that are stacked and arranged ingeniously to form the battlement for an illusion.” But 
accountants do not face “… an audience that welcomes being deceived, then dares to be fooled, 
alternately questioning, prodding, and surrendering.” There is no battle, with the audience hav-
ing surrendered without the forces ever having become engaged. According to the magician 
Donald Devant:
I regard a conjurer as a man who can hold the attention of his audience by telling them the most 
impossible fairy tales and by persuading them into believing that those stories are true by illus-
trating them with his hands, or with any object that may be suitable for the purpose (quoted in 
Steinmeyer 2003, p. 93).
Substitute the word “accountant” for “conjurer,” the word “certiﬁ  cations” for “hands,” and one is 
left with a possible perception of the accounting profession.
It is disingenuous to believe that accountants are not cognizant of their audience. According to 
Steinmeyer (2003, p. 117):
When magicians are good at their jobs, it is because they anticipate the way an audience thinks. 
They are able to suggest a series of clues that guide the audience to the deception. Great magi-
cians don’t leave the audience’s thought patterns to chance; they depend on the audience’s bring-
ing something to the table – preconceptions or assumptions that can be naturally exploited.
This is equally true of accountants. The difference, though, is that magicians consciously exploit 
their audiences. With regard to “preconceptions or assumptions that can be naturally exploited”,   
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however, accountants and their audiences are in the same position, subconsciously complicit in 
mutual exploitation.
  | Magic and cognition
The conjuring effects most likely to have accounting analogs are: appearance (“An object appears 
where it was not”), vanish (“An object disappears from where it was”), and transformation (“An 
object changes form… Conceptually, this amounts to the vanish of one object and the appearance 
of another”) (Lamont and Wiseman 1999, p. 3–4). Consider the following methodological strate-
gies (Lamont and Wiseman 1999, p. 11–12):
1) Appearance: a. Object was already there but was concealed, b. Object was secretly put in 
position, and c. Object is not actually there but appears to be; 
2) Vanish: a. Object was not there but appeared to be there, b. Object was secretly removed, and 
c. Object is still there but is concealed; and 
3) Transformation: Object A was secretly switched for B, b. Object B was already there but was 
disguised as A, and c. Object A is still there but is disguised as B. 
To implement these strategies are the methodological devices of (Lamont and Wiseman 1999, 
p. 170–173):
• “Concealment of an object from view” (strategies 1a and 2c); 
• “Smuggling of an object in secret” (strategies 1b and 2b); 
• “Simulation of an object that is not there” (strategies 1c and 2a); 
• “Substitution of an object for another” (strategy 3a); and 
• “Disguise of  an object as another” (strategies 3b and 3c).  
Likewise, accountants, following the established accounting rules, structure the reality they set 
out to represent, that is, they choose what pieces become objects in their representations (appear-
ance) and what pieces do not (vanish) and how these objects are deﬁ  ned and their boundaries 
drawn (transformation). It is not a stretch to assert that accountants conceal (fail to represent 
something that is), simulate (represent something which is not), substitute (represent something 
as something else is), and disguise (represent something as it is not). Only smuggling does not 
have an obvious analog.
Misdirection is the principle underlying most conjuring methods: physical misdirection direct-
ing the spectator’s attention and psychological misdirection directing the spectator’s suspicion. 
Physical misdirection of where and when the spectator is looking can occur only during a public 
performance, which magicians must do but accountants never do. Psychological misdirection by 
reducing suspicion through naturalness (consistency and necessity), justiﬁ  cation (familiarization   
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and ruse), conviction (charisma, self-conviction, and reinforcement) and psychological misdirec-
tion by diverting suspicion through false solutions and through false expectations (Lamont and 
Wiseman 1999, p. 38) are essential for both magicians and accountants. 
Neither magicians’ events nor accountants’ representations are natural, although it is in the 
interests of the magicians and the accountants that the events and representations appear as if 
they are. What is consistent with spectators’ experiences and with which spectators can empa-
thize and reckon to be necessary or at least appropriate will appear to be natural. What might 
not normally appear to be natural can be made consistent through familiarization or made to 
appear necessary through ruse. If the magician or accountant is charismatic, appears to possess 
self-conviction in the naturalness of the event (the magician) or actually possesses self-conviction 
in the naturalness of the representation (the accountant) and reinforces the naturalness, specta-
tors are more likely to agree. Magicians are more likely to encounter suspicion than accountants 
because their spectators know that they are being tricked. Of course, dishonest accountants must 
also divert suspicion, but as honest accountants are tricking themselves along with their specta-
tors, suspicion is not an issue.
Cognition occurs throughout the nervous system from the sense organs through to the brain. 
Although precise delineation is impossible, one might roughly classify the targets of trickery as 
either upstream sensory input and its processing or as downstream abstract information pro-
cessing. In a broad sense, human evolution have led to the acquisition of capabilities for which 
the survival beneﬁ  ts of their acquisition has exceeded their survival costs (Barrett 2010). Each 
of the aforementioned parts of the nervous system is “faulty”, at least by engineering standards, 
for slightly different reasons. Sensory input and its processing are faulty more for reasons of 
economy; what one is capable of was good enough to be reproductively competitive in the hos-
tile environments within which the human nervous system evolved and is generally more than 
good enough to reproduce in the very different and relatively benign environments that most 
humans now inhabit. The sharp eyesight needed to hunt large mammals on the veldt is no longer 
an especially valuable quality in modern males, except for those rare males using it to capture 
long passes on the football ﬁ  eld and impress female spectators. Abstract information processing 
is faulty because demands on cognition have changed. Sophisticated quantitative risk assess-
ment skills did not evolve because they would not have mattered for reproductive success on the 
African savannah. However, those who have those skills nowadays might transform investment 
success into reproductive success in urban jungles.
Magic clearly exploits faulty sensory input and sensory input processing. Behavioral ﬁ  nance 
and accounting are concerned with logically faulty abstract information processing, which is 
clearly exploited by the gaming industry6 and perhaps in more subtle ways elsewhere within 
6  For example, roulette tables often feature displays of past winning colors and numbers to take advantage of the innate belief that what 
has or has not happened in the past determines what will or will not happen in the future.  
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ﬁ  nancial markets. It is likely that accounting exploits both, but this study is speciﬁ  cally con-
cerned with the overlaps with magic. It is not a perfect overlap. Magic is always performed by 
a magician in front of an audience in real time, which permits magicians to take advantage of 
cognitive processes in ways not open to accountants, whose contact with spectators is via time-
delayed documentation. While magicians are able to trick other magicians, they are unable to 
trick themselves, which accountants are able to do. The speciﬁ  c cognitive processes that both 
magicians and accountants enlist in their trickery are good continuation, habituation, attentional 
capture and even hormonal stimulation. In short, “good continuation” is the process by which 
complete mental representations are produced from partial information; “habituation” is induced 
complacency; “attentional capture” is the exogenous (passive) or endogenous (active) direction of 
conscious attention; and the stimulated hormone is oxytocin, which engenders a feeling of trust 
(Macknik and Martinez-Conde 2010).
A few examples illustrate how these cognitive processes are exploited by magicians. If a head 
protrudes from one end of a box and feet from another, spectators assume the continuity of 
a body between the two. If two spoons with bent shafts are held in a special way with the bends 
concealed, spectators assume spoons having straight continuous shafts that cross each other. 
A magician can therefore saw an assistant in half who was never just a single assistant and 
bend two spoons that were never straight. Habituation contributes to the same tricks; that is, 
people are habituated through everyday experience to boxes with interiors without partitions 
and spoons with straight shafts. Habituation forms a powerful barrier to seeing a box that con-
sists of two separable pieces and spoons with bent shafts. Inattentional blindness is ubiquitous 
in stage magic; audiences are compelled to attend to the dramatic motion of one hand while the 
other hand performs a stealthy maneuver (placing a coin in a pocket, for example) in full view 
but completely ignored (Macknik and Martinez-Conde 2010). In effect, inattentional blindness 
is a consequence of humans’ inability to multitask, despite their illusion that they can do so: 
concentration on one thing necessarily precludes concentration on any others. The most notori-
ous example of inattentional blindness is the common failure to see a person in a gorilla suit in 
a video when the viewers have been distracted by the task of counting how many times other 
characters in the video have passed a basketball (Simons and Chabris 1999). The tuxedo has 
become the traditional uniform of stage magicians to exploit audiences’ inclination to trust those 
so attired. The question, then, is how accounting engages these same cognitive processes in its 
own effects.
  | Magic and accounting
There are a number of very familiar accounting phenomena that engage these same cognitive 
processes, although it is not so obvious that this is what they are doing. Many persons believe 
that financial statements present the “truth”, and many other persons more knowledgeable 
regarding accounting might more speciﬁ  cally believe that the ﬁ  nancial statements present the   
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“truth” in accordance with the U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) and as veri-
ﬁ  ed by professional auditors. In effect, this is a consequence of good continuation; the societal 
and cultural role of accounting is such that the descriptor “truthful” is just read onto it.
 This occurs despite U.S. accounting standards setters’ assertion in the Statement of Financial 
Accounting Concepts No. 8 (FASB 2010, p. 1) that “the objective of general purpose ﬁ  nancial 
reporting is to provide ﬁ  nancial information about the reporting entity that is useful (emphasis 
added) to existing and potential investors, lenders, and other creditors in making decisions about 
providing resources to the entity.” Further, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) 
states: “… if ﬁ  nancial information is to be useful, it must be relevant and faithfully represent 
what it purports to represent. The usefulness of ﬁ  nancial information is enhanced if it is compa-
rable, veriﬁ  able, timely, and understandable” (FASB 2010, p. 16).
Nowhere do the standard setters mention “truth,” although the term “faithfully represent” comes 
close enough to “truth” for most people. According to Bayou et al. (2011, p. 112), “... for standard 
setters the overriding criterion of decision usefulness, which FASB and IASB [International 
Accounting Standards Board] narrowly deﬁ  ne as helping to predict cash ﬂ  ows, has replaced 
veracity in ﬁ  nancial reporting as an end in itself”. However, it is historically interesting to note 
that on 12 March 1903, U.S. Steel published their consolidated financial statements for the 
period ended 31 December 1902, along with the Price Waterhouse & Company’s assurance that 
the ﬁ  nancial statements were “audited and found correct” (Carey 1969, p. 29). So while it was 
once true that “truth” was the objective of ﬁ  nancial reporting in a simpler era of physical assets 
and straightforward production of goods, good continuation is responsible for the prevailing 
expectation today that ﬁ  nancial statements are correct in a far more complex time of intangible 
intellectual property and the provision of abstract services.
A notorious lacuna in ﬁ  nancial statements is that the auditor certiﬁ  cation says nothing about 
fraud; yet in the eyes of most people, the purpose of an audit is to detect fraud. Although that is 
indeed one of the purposes of an internal audit performed by corporate accountants, following 
their external audit, public accountants state simply that “In our opinion, the consolidated ﬁ  nan-
cial statements referred to above present fairly, in all material respects, the ﬁ  nancial position 
of … in conformity with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles.” Under the inﬂ  uence of 
good continuation, readers gloss over the common disclaimer “Because of its inherent limita-
tions, internal control over ﬁ  nancial reporting may not prevent or detect misstatements,” instead 
ﬁ  lling in the opposite to the effect that no one is engaged in any deceptive practices.
GAAP clearly states what is included in the ﬁ  nancial statements and by implication (and only 
by implication) what is thereby excluded from the ﬁ  nancial statements. That the balance sheet 
balances, however, send a strong signal to readers of the ﬁ  nancial statements that nothing is 
excluded, despite wildly different book values and market values that are clearly an indication 
that something is not in balance. How could something balance mathematically if something   
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were missing? But much is missing: commitments; contracts such as agreements to purchase 
or sell something in the future, employment contracts for key employees, and union contracts; 
certain contingencies; plans such as those to purchase a business, sell a business, or expand 
a business; the effects of inﬂ  ation etc. – the list goes on and on. What of all of the non-economic 
consequences of corporate activity that have profound effects on every stakeholder but that are 
excluded from the ﬁ  nancial statements because there is no contract or transaction documenting 
their existence? Owing to good continuation, one can see in disclosures what isn’t there because 
one expects it to be there; on the balance sheet, one doesn’t see what isn’t there because one 
doesn’t expect anything not to be there.
Perhaps the most signiﬁ  cant distortions in interpretations of ﬁ  nancial statements are the conse-
quences of habituation. In their daily lives, people become habituated to words having certain 
meanings and connotations, and in their personal affairs, people become habituated to ﬁ  nancial 
matters obeying certain rules. More speciﬁ  cally, they become accustomed to a precision in per-
sonal ﬁ  nances that is not there, by necessity or by design, in corporate ﬁ  nances. Consider “inven-
tory”, the mental image that something is out there somewhere for which some price was paid, 
and presumably from which at least the same value could be realized in a market if necessary. 
The reality is that after inventory valuation methods, manufacturing cost allocation methods 
and policies for culling inventory of obsolete or unsalable items are taken into account, there is 
only a tenuous connection between the inventory value that appears on the balance sheet and the 
realizable value if the inventory were disposed of on the market, despite the reported valuation 
being fully in accordance with GAAP. Consequently, there is only a tenuous connection between 
the concept “inventory” in minds and the “inventory” that aggregates as an amount reported on 
the balance sheet.
“Expenses” are something that have also become even more differentially habituated. People 
spend their own money on things that they might have around for a few seconds (a shot of 
espresso), pass down through their descendants for a few hundred years (a diamond ring), or 
enjoy for any length of time in between. It matters only that they exchanged cash for them, and 
this is what “expense” means to them. Corporations don’t just spend money; they exchange it 
for something that is worth keeping track of (assets) or not (expenses). Assets will last less than 
a year (current assets) or more than a year (long-term assets). Some assets can be broken down 
into nuanced categories that are often difﬁ  cult to differentiate (cash and cash equivalents, mar-
ketable securities, or investments). Expenses will either be recurring in core activities (operating 
expenses), recurring in ancillary activities (non-operating expenses) or non-recurring (extraor-
dinary expenses). There are ways by which assets are transformed into expenses (inventory 
becomes cost of goods sold expense; furniture, ﬁ  xtures, and equipment become depreciation 
expense) without any money changing hands. There are even expenses that might more properly 
be considered assets (research and development expenditures or internally generated intangible 
assets such as patents) that GAAP requires be recorded immediately as an expense, although few 
could argue that these expenditures do not have future value for the company. Yet again, all of   
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these records can be prepared fully in accordance with GAAP while resulting in a variable some-
thing called “total expenses” for a corporation that is nothing like what people are personally 
familiar with.  Unlike physical laws, which are everywhere constant, use of IASB GAAP versus 
FASB GAAP can create wholly different universes.  For example, a world in which research and 
development costs are expensed (as under FASB) can look very different than one in which cer-
tain research and development costs can be capitalized as assets (as under IASB). 
“Income” is likely the most misunderstood word. Personal “income” corresponds most closely 
with corporate “revenue”: money received in exchange for a person or corporation having pro-
vided something in return.  Corporate “operating income” has no personal ﬁ  nance analog. There 
isn’t all that much uncertainty regarding the amount of personal income, and given a known tax 
rate, not all that much uncertainty regarding personal taxation. GAAP permits corporate operat-
ing income to vary over an astonishing range, depending on numerous choices corporations are 
permitted to make, to the point that ofﬁ  cial tax rates are largely meaningless from a public policy 
standpoint. Despite that, taxation debates proceed as if corporate operating income and tax rates 
meant the same things to which people have become habituated as individuals. More subtly, it 
is not incorrect to say that individuals have an income. Consistent with the familiar image of 
“income”, with enough careful records keeping, individuals can come up with exactly how much 
money they have been given over a period of time by someone for something. Through habituation 
of the concept of income, one can therefore infer that with enough careful records keeping and suf-
ﬁ  ciently comprehensive rules, corporations can come up with an exact income. Although it might 
be practically impossible to discover a corporation’s “true” income, in theory there is one, and with 
enough effort one can be more accurate and come closer to determining it. However plausible it 
feels, more devoted adherence to GAAP (whatever that might mean given GAAP’s ﬂ  exibility) 
does not necessarily mean a more accurate and more “truthful” measure of income.
“Information”, such as it is given the preceding discussion, captures immediate attention in 
precisely aligned and structured ﬁ  nancial statements. Information in footnotes to ﬁ  nancial state-
ments captures less attention. Information in management discussion and analysis (MDA) sec-
tions captures even less attention. Not surprisingly, extensive academic empirical research exists 
suggesting that the format in which information is presented (for example, disclosure in the 
footnotes versus recognition in the ﬁ  nancial statements themselves) affects the extent to which 
the information affects users’ judgments. These empirical studies indicate that information dis-
closed outside of the ﬁ  nancial statements is considered less useful than information included 
in the ﬁ  nancial statements (Liang and Zhang, 2006; Maines and McDaniel, 2000; Nelson and 
Tayler, 2007 among many). Additionally, information associated with captions or terms with 
which readers are familiar, or at least believe themselves to be familiar (i.e. “accounts payable,” 
“last-in-ﬁ  rst-out inventory valuation”) captures more attention than information in less easily 
comprehended categories (i.e. “other payables”, “special purpose entities”). The presentation of 
ﬁ  nancial information in compliance with GAAP very clearly directs one’s gaze in speciﬁ  c direc-
tions and perhaps away from other areas.  
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Finally, the stereotypical attire and accessories of an accountant (conservative business dress, 
briefcase, and the ubiquitous laptop) can serve the same purpose as the tuxedo worn by stage 
musicians. Both uniforms are intended to build trust. Audit ﬁ  rms hold week-long annual training 
sessions, not only to update the staff’s technical knowledge, but also to reinforce the culture of the 
ﬁ  rm and what it means to be an accountant and an auditor and to mold a trustworthy employee. 
Professional certiﬁ  cations such as a Certiﬁ  ed Public Accountant (CPA), Chartered Accountant 
(CA), or Certiﬁ  ed Management Accountant (CMA) along with Continuing Professional Education 
(CPE) hours are all letters and designations that signal to the public that the person possessing 
them knows the “truth” and can be trusted to tell it in the ﬁ  nancial statements. Many studies have 
examined the connection between professional appearance and demeanor and the perceptions of 
clients and other observers (Anderson-Gough et al. 2000, 2001, 2002; Carrington, 2010; Covaleski 
et al., 1998). Accounting journals directed towards practitioners have long offered advice regarding 
professionalism and success in the workplace (Hindin-Miller, 2009; Pachter, 2010).
  | Conclusions: magic and expertise
The likely reaction to these examples is that “outsiders” are susceptible to cognitive biases such 
as good continuation, habituation, attentional capture, and in their assessment of ﬁ  nancial infor-
mation, but “experts” in accounting are not. “Experts” know what is and is not presented in the 
ﬁ  nancial information and do not just ﬁ  ll in the blanks or ﬁ  lter out the blanks.  They have been 
habituated by their professional practice and not by their personal experience, and they know 
what the captions and their values on ﬁ  nancial statements really mean. “Experts” are not dis-
tracted by where information is presented but seek out information wherever it might be found. 
They are not deceived by the meaning, or lack thereof, of educational credentials or professional 
appearance and accessorization  (Shanteau 1992; Shanteau et al. 2002).
Perhaps “experts” are indeed so immune from the cognitive quirks to which others are suscep-
tible, but perhaps they are not. There is extensive academic research examining data and behav-
iors that indicate that management (and accountants) engage in some level of deceptive prac-
tices in their ﬁ  nancial reporting, often called earnings management, to meet earnings targets or 
market expectations and to achieve professional and/or personal gain (Dechow et al. 1995; Jones 
1991; Matsumoto 2002; among many). These practices are not always insigniﬁ  cant or subtle, yet 
they often pass unremarked by expert analysts. Following this idea to an extreme, one has to 
ask, for example, how the corporate scandals of the early twenty-ﬁ  rst century such as Enron and 
Worldcom and the Ponzi schemes of Bernard Madoff and Allen Stanford could have ﬂ  ourished 
for as long as they did under the scrutiny of an army of so-called “experts.” At least equally fasci-
nating is how, in retrospect, such deceptions and frauds all appear to have been so obvious. Even 
in the absence of deceptive actions, “experts” admit that GAAP allows managers a wide range 
of discretion in the choice of accounting methods and moving towards a more principles-based 
regime will likely add more discretionary latitude to accountants.   
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Everyone has cognitive processes that can be intentionally or unintentionally hacked. Even 
professional magicians can be mystiﬁ  ed by other magicians. On stage, there are often numerous 
ways to create an effect. Magicians looking for one effect can fail to see another. Likewise, try as 
they might to be alert to fraud and error, “experts” have limited cognitive capacity, and they can 
certainly be more easily fooled than professional magicians because for the most part they are 
not expecting to be fooled, at least not massively so. Seeking out one blank in a ﬁ  nancial report, 
their good continuation can be ﬁ  lling in another. Deeply investigating one caption in a ﬁ  nancial 
statement, they can read a familiar interpretation into another. Diligently deciphering an expla-
nation in the MDA, a problematic footnote can escape their attention. While they are aware of 
trust-building strategies and practice them themselves, “experts” are still human and susceptible 
to the same social cues as their distant ancestors in southern Africa, the Paleolithic equivalents 
of briefcases and laptops.
Lately, magic has been given increasing attention by psychologists for what it can reveal about 
how the human cognitive system works.  Further research regarding such interactions between 
accounting and cognition has potential for enhancing the understanding of both. Certainly at 
this particular point in accounting history, as standard setters seem to be moving ever closer to 
implementing some version of a principles-based accounting regime versus the current rules-
based accounting regime, it is worthwhile to contemplate the conscious and subconscious effects 
of cognitive processes on how individuals perceive ﬁ  nancial information. 
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